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Abstract
Substantial evidence suggests that the phasic activity of dopamine neurons represents rein-
forcement learning’s temporal difference prediction error. However, recent reports of ramp-
like increases in dopamine concentration in the striatum when animals are about to act, or
are about to reach rewards, appear to pose a challenge to established thinking. This is
because the implied activity is persistently predictable by preceding stimuli, and so cannot
arise as this sort of prediction error. Here, we explore three possible accounts of such ramp-
ing signals: (a) the resolution of uncertainty about the timing of action; (b) the direct influ-
ence of dopamine over mechanisms associated with making choices; and (c) a new model
of discounted vigour. Collectively, these suggest that dopamine ramps may be explained,
with only minor disturbance, by standard theoretical ideas, though urgent questions remain
regarding their proximal cause. We suggest experimental approaches to disentangling
which of the proposed mechanisms are responsible for dopamine ramps.
Author Summary
Dopamine has long been implicated in reward-motivated behaviour. Theory and experi-
ments suggest that activity of dopamine-containing neurons resembles a temporally-
sophisticated prediction error used to learn expectations of future reward. This account
would appear to be inconsistent with recent observations of ‘ramps’, i.e., gradual increases
in extracellular dopamine concentration prior to the execution of actions or the acquisi-
tion of rewards. We explore three different possible explanations of such ramping signals
as arising: (a) when subjects experience uncertainty about when actions will be executed;
(b) when dopamine itself influences the timecourse of choice; and (c) under a new model
in which ‘quasi-tonic’ dopamine signals arise through a form of temporal discounting. We
thereby show that dopamine ramps can be integrated with current theories, and also sug-
gest experiments to clarify which mechanisms are involved.
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Introduction
Ideas from the field of reinforcement learning (RL) have played an important role in neurosci-
entific theories of how animals choose actions to gain rewards and avoid punishments. Promi-
nently, it has been suggested [1, 2] that the phasic responses of midbrain dopaminergic
neurons resemble a temporal difference (TD) error, a learning signal which facilitates predic-
tion and control of rewarding events [3, 4]. Consistent with this notion, these neurons are acti-
vated by unpredicted primary rewards and by cues that predict such rewards, but not by
rewards that are themselves reliably predicted. More recent experiments using fast scan cyclic
voltammetry (FSCV) to measure rapid changes in extracellular dopamine concentration within
projection areas, notably the nucleus accumbens (NAc), find transients which show similar
TD-like properties [5–7] (Fig 1).
However, recent reports of ramp-like increases in dopamine concentration preceding self-
initiated instrumental responses [8–13] and during approach to spatial locations associated
with reward [14] appear to pose a challenge to established thinking. The central issue for TD
accounts of dopamine is why such ramping should be observed at all, since TD provides a
mechanism for predicting away later dopaminergic activity by earlier—as in the case of the
transfer of activity from the time of reward to the time of predictive cues.
Fig 1. Phasic dopamine signals resemble a temporal difference error. (A) Changes in extracellular dopamine concentration (Δ[DA]) in the nucleus
accumbens (NAc) core before (left; single trial) and after (right; mean + SEM) experience of repeated pairings between a predictive cue (horizontal black bar)
and a reward (inverted black triangle) delivered at cue offset. Initially, a phasic increase in dopamine is observed at the time of reward delivery. After repeated
experience of the relationship between cue and reward, a phasic increase is observed at the time of cue onset, but not at the time of reward, which is still
delivered. Adapted from [6], with permission. (B) Models based on temporal difference (TD) learning predict transfer of the TD error δt from the time of reward
(‘R’; left) to time of predictive cue (‘CS’; right) over the course of learning for both trace and delay conditioning.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g001
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One possibility is that these signals have no functional importance, for instance being the
result of a process of gated release [14, 15]. In this, a form of ramping activity in the glutama-
tergic cortico-striatal input might cause the terminals of the dopamine neurons to discharge
more of the neuromodulator. This would account for the excess release without any implica-
tion for the activity of dopamine neurons—and would mainly pose the question as to how the
altered pattern of release could have no effect on striatal activity or plasticity. In the current
paper, however, we consider three possible, non-mutually exclusive, functional explanations
of NAc dopamine ramps. Firstly, we consider that increases in dopamine which precede an
animal’s response may reflect resolution of uncertainty about the time of action. Secondly, we
show that ramping may arise if dopamine plays a direct role in modulating the gain of a deci-
sion-making process in which value information is integrated over time. Finally, we introduce
a discounted model of vigour which may explain the more macroscopic ramping signals
observed in [14].
We start by sketching what might be considered the ‘standard’ computational account of
dopamine and examining the confounding experimental phenomena.
Phasic dopamine and TD error
In the main class of TD models of the phasic dopamine response [1, 2, 16], the computational
goal of learning is to predict from each state s the expected discounted sum V(s) of the rewards
that will be encountered during a trial
VðsÞ ¼ Efg0rt þ g1rtþ1 þ g2rtþ2 þ . . . jst ¼ sg; ð1Þ
where rt is the reward delivered at time t, and 0 γ 1 is a discount factor that controls how
much weight is given to future relative to immediate rewards. Crucially, the deﬁnition of this
state value function satisﬁes a (Bellman) consistency condition with respect to each possible
next state s′:
VðsÞ ¼ Efrt þ gVðs0Þg: ð2Þ
This leads to the idea of using local discrepancies in the value of sampled successive states to
drive learning [3, 4, 17, 18]. Thus, the TD error δt is deﬁned as
dt ¼ rt þ gVðstþ1Þ  VðstÞ; ð3Þ
and can be used to improve estimates of V(s). It is exactly this TD error that phasic dopaminer-
gic activity has been hypothesized to represent.
As noted, in this paper, we consider data on dopamine concentrations in target structures
(denoted [DA]) rather than the phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons. These quantities are
known to be related [19]; we assume this relationship is simple—a ‘dopamine response func-
tion’ (DRF) based qualitatively on the signal evoked in NAc by VTA stimulation (Fig 2). We
model the DRF using an alpha function
f ðtÞ ¼ t
x
e1
t
x; ð4Þ
with time constant ξ = 0.7s set to match experimental observations [10]. In other words, dopa-
minergic activity at time t, which we tendentiously denote dpt— a phasic TD error—causes an
increase in dopamine concentration that peaks after a delay of ξ seconds and then decays with
time constant ξ. Thus, changes in dopamine concentration levels relative to baseline, Δ[DA],
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are acquired by convolving time-varying activity dpt with the DRF described in Eq (4):
D½DA / dp  f 
Z þ1
1
ds dpðsÞf ðt  sÞ: ð5Þ
We should note two important caveats to this model. First, there is evidence for richer temporal
and non-linear structure in the DRF [20], albeit perhaps most affecting timescales and
strengths of responding that are different from those considered here. Of more immediate note
is that while there is evidence that ﬂuctuations in dopamine concentration within NAc sym-
metrically encode positive and negative prediction errors [21], other studies do not show such
clear negative deviations from baseline corresponding to a negative prediction error (e.g. [22]).
Indeed, evidence suggests that negative prediction errors are represented differently from posi-
tive prediction errors in the activity of midbrain dopaminergic neurons: while positive predic-
tion errors appear to correlate positively with the ﬁring rates of dopaminergic neurons, the
magnitude of negative prediction errors correlates rather with the duration of a pause in burst
ﬁring [23, 24], though this itself generates additional complexities. To incorporate the possibil-
ity of an asymmetry in how positive and negative prediction errors affect dopamine concentra-
tion, below we also examine the effect on dopamine concentration of ﬁrst asymmetrically
scaling negative prediction errors by a factor of d = 1/6 [25].
The second caveat is that modulation of striatal dopamine concentrations can occur indepen-
dently of changes in the observed firing rates of dopaminergic cells. Thus, tonic levels of striatal
dopamine are thought to be controlled by the number of active dopaminergic cells rather than
by the firing rates of a fixed pool of neurons [26]. Furthermore, a range of mechanisms local to
the striatum are known to play a role in regulating dopamine release, including a host of other
neurotransmitters such as glutamate, acetylcholine, and GABA (for recent reviews, see [27, 28]).
Actors and critics
In a case more general than that of learning purely to predict, animals may be allowed to select
actions to achieve desired outcomes. A mapping from states to actions is usually referred to as
Fig 2. Dopamine response function. Left: Change in NAc extracellular dopamine concentration evoked by electrical stimulation of VTA (red boxes indicate
points at which electrical stimulation began and ended). Adapted from [10], with permission. Right: alpha function used to model the effect of a punctate, non-
zero TD error (red triangle) on dopamine concentration (Eq (4)).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g002
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a policy, denoted π, and the more general problem is to find a policy which maximizes some
measure of reward. The TD error signal defined in Eq (3) can be used to evaluate state values
with respect to a given policy, Vπ(s). Given this value function, the agent can potentially
improve on its current policy by selecting actions that lead to successor states of higher value.
Iteration between successive steps of policy evaluation and policy improvement characterises
the policy iteration algorithm [29, 30] which is a cornerstone of RL methods [4].
The actor-critic algorithm [31], an asynchronous version of policy iteration, is just one of a
number of TD-based suggestions for RL [4]. However, it has played a particularly salient role in
neural RL modelling [16, 32–34]. In the actor-critic architecture, state values and policy are explic-
itly represented in different memory structures. The policy structure is known as the actor, since it
is responsible for selecting actions; and the value structure is known as the critic, since it criticizes
actions taken by the actor, where this critique takes the form of the TD error described above.
In terms of neural substrate, it has been suggested that the dual learning functions of the
actor-critic map to a fundamental division in the functional anatomy of striatum into dorsal
and ventral subregions [1, 33, 35, 36]. In particular, the ventral striatum (NAc) is implicated in
reward and motivation [37], while the dorsal striatum is implicated in motor and cognitive
control [38]. This dissociation is consistent with an implementation of actor and critic compo-
nents in the dorsal and ventral striatum, respectively [1, 36].
Tonic dopamine and vigour
Initial theorizing in neural RL focused on tasks involving a simple action or choice between dif-
ferent discrete actions in response to an explicit experimental cue. More recent modelling work
has sought to extend standard RL models to other dimensions of choice, thereby making con-
tact with the large experimental literature on free operant tasks in which subjects not only
choose between different actions but also when and how quickly to act [39–41].
Two key differences from previous work have been involved in the first collection of models
of free operant tasks. Firstly, the agent not only chooses an action a to perform, but also an
associated latency τ with which to perform it. Formally, this entails moving from the usual dis-
crete Markov decision process (MDP) model, in which agent-environment interactions prog-
ress at fixed time intervals, to a semi-Markov decision process (SMDP) [42], which permits the
time spent in a particular state to follow an arbitrary probability distribution. Secondly, rather
than assuming that the agent aims—at least approximately—to maximize an expected sum of
discounted future rewards, models have assumed an average reward criterion. In this case, the
aim is to find a policy that maximizes the long-run average reward rate
rp  lim
n!1
Ep
1
n
Xn
t¼0
rt
( )
; ð6Þ
which is independent of starting state, assuming ergodicity. The value of a state under policy π
is now deﬁned relative to the long-run average reward under that policy, ρπ, and can be
denoted ~V pðsÞ to highlight that this is a relative value [4]:
~V pðsÞ ¼ Ep
X1
k¼0
ðrtþk  rpÞjst ¼ s
( )
: ð7Þ
Similarly, the relative action value ~Qpðs; aÞ of taking action a in state s is deﬁned as
~Qpðs; aÞ ¼ Ep
X1
k¼0
ðrtþk  rpÞjst ¼ s; at ¼ a
( )
: ð8Þ
Tamping Ramping: Explanations of Phasic Dopamine Signals in the Accumbens
PLOS Computational Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622 December 23, 2015 5 / 34
For example, consider the case in which there is just a single action—a lever press—to perform,
and the decision concerns the latency τ with which to perform it. For consistency with earlier
results, we temporarily consider the case of continuous time. Assume that τ is selected, follow-
ing presentation of an explicit cue, in an initial state ‘1’. After the selected time τ, there is a tran-
sition to a second state ‘2’ in which the lever press completes and reward is delivered.
Subsequent transition back to state 1 follows immediately, and the process begins anew (Fig
3A). Niv et al. [39] considered a hyperbolic cost structure in which a lever press of latency τ is
more costly depending on its speed. In particular, they adopted the function form for the cost:
a/τ + b, where b 0 is a unit cost for the press, and a 0 is a factor which determines the mag-
nitude of hyperbolic dependence on τ. Each lever press is assumed to yield an immediate
reward of utility r> 0. As shown by Niv et al. [39], the theory of average reward RL tells us to
select the optimal lever-press latency τ in state 1 that maximizes the optimal relative Q-value,
t ¼ argmaxt ~Qð1; tÞ
  ¼ argmaxt at þ bþ r  rtþ ~V ð2Þ
n o
; ð9Þ
where asterisks are used to indicate values corresponding to an optimal policy. As noted in
[39], the optimal latency here is controlled by the opposing forces of the (negative) utility of
acting quickly, a/τ, and the opportunity of cost of acting slowly, −ρτ. This latter term arises
from Eq (8) since ρ (which is ρπ when executing the optimal policy) is accumulated over all
the timesteps comprising latency τ. Indeed we have
t ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃa
r
r
; ð10Þ
which shows that the optimal latency decreases as the average utility rate ρ increases. Since ρ
also depends on τ, the problem is recursive, but techniques for ﬁnding the optimal solution
exist [42, 43].
The connection to current concerns is the proposal that the tonic level of dopamine, espe-
cially in NAc, represents the long-run average rate of reward ρπ, effectively signalling an oppor-
tunity cost of sloth [39, 44]. This suggestion is based on a long literature implicating dopamine
in the modulation of behavioural vigour [45]. It has been further supported by recent human
studies [46, 47], albeit assuming that this long-run average rate arises as a slowly-changing run-
ning estimate. The equivalent of the dopamine response function for this signal is unexplored.
Fig 3. Two conceptions of a cued lever press. (A) A latency τ with which to press the lever is selected in an initial cued state (‘1’), leading to completion of
the press τ seconds later (‘2’). (B) A latency τ with which to press the lever is selected in an initial cued state (‘1’), leading to a state of preparedness to press τ
seconds later (‘2’). Completion of the press (‘3’) occurs only after a subsequent interval τpost. After a further inter-trial interval τI, the process begins anew.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g003
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Dayan [41] has recently broadened the theoretical study of instrumental vigour to include the
case of acting to avoid punishment.
Ramping dopamine concentrations
A first example of the phenomena of interest comes from an experiment by Roitman et al. [10]
very similar in structure to the lever pressing case considered above. Following presentation of
an explicit cue, a rat could press a lever at a time of its own choosing to receive a sucrose reward
(Fig 4A). Cue presentation evoked an increase in dopamine concentration in NAc (Fig 4B,
upper trace), but not in control animals for which a lever press did not yield reward (Fig 4B,
lower trace). The apparent decrease in signal in the latter case was found not to be caused by a
change in dopamine concentration [10]. However, Roitman et al. also observed that, when
aligned to the time of lever pressing, average dopamine concentration began to increase a short
time before the time of the lever press itself, reaching peak concentration around the time of
pressing (Fig 4C and 4D). Crucially, this occurred not only on the majority of the trials (83%) in
which animals pressed the lever at relatively short latencies following the initial cue (<5 s; Fig
4C), but also on the smaller number of trials in which animals responded at longer latencies
(>5 s; Fig 4D). Similar increases in extracellular dopamine just prior to response have been
reported in other FSCV studies [8, 9, 11–13]. Roitman et al. also reported that while cue-aligned
and press-aligned peak dopamine concentrations were indistinguishable for short-latency trials
(68±19 nM vs. 73±23 nM), press-aligned peak dopamine was significantly larger than cue-
aligned peak dopamine on long-latency trials (54±17 nM vs. 110±20 nM; Fig 4D, inset).
A second, perhaps more dramatic, example of dopamine ramping has recently been
reported by Howe et al. [14] (Fig 5). In this study, dopamine concentrations in the striatum
Fig 4. Roitman et al. [10] reported increases in average NAc dopamine concentration that occur shortly before completion of a lever press for
reward. (A) Task: rats press a lever at a time of their own choosing for reward (intra-oral sucrose) following a cue indicating that reward is available. (B) Cue
presentation (black triangle) evokes a phasic increase in dopamine concentration (mean + SEM) if the cue indicates that reward is available (upper trace), but
not when there is no such cue-reward pairing (lower trace); the decrease in signal in the latter case is not caused by dopamine [10]. (C;D) When aligned to
time of lever press (vertical dashed line), dopamine concentration is observed to peak at the time of the press, beginning to increase shortly before this time.
This is observed both for (C) short-latency trials, where presses are emitted shortly after presentation of the cue (<5 s; average time of presentation indicated
by black triangle, range represented by horizontal scale bar) and (D) long-latency trials, where there is a longer delay between cue and response (>5 s). On
long-latency trials, average peak dopamine concentration is higher around time of response than around time of cue (D, inset). A lever press leads to both
sucrose infusion (black bar) and presentation of a tone-light stimulus (open bar). Figures B–D adapted from [10], with permission.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g004
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were measured using FSCV while rats navigated mazes to obtain remote rewards. It found a
gradual increase in dopamine concentration that began at trial onset and ended after reaching
the goal (Fig 5A). Whether rats took a relatively short or long time to reach the goal, dopamine
peaked at similar concentrations at the goal (Fig 5B, upper). Similarly, dopamine peaked at
comparable concentrations at the goal for mazes of different length (Fig 5B, lower). Single-trial
examples in which rats paused mid-run showed a remarkable correspondence between prox-
imity to the goal and dopamine concentration (Fig 5C). Furthermore, dopamine ramps scaled
with size of reward, so that peak dopamine was higher for larger than smaller rewards (see
[14], figure 3).
While we take both of these examples to be instances of dopamine ramping, their explana-
tions may not be identical. Nevertheless, neither case seems to fit neatly with standard RL mod-
els because apparently reliable activity is not predicted away by earlier reliable cues.
Models and Results
We consider three possible, non-mutually exclusive, explanations of NAc dopamine ramps.
First, we consider possible sources of predictive uncertainty arising within the actor-critic
about when actions will be performed. We show that a TD account in which a prediction error
is generated when such uncertainty is resolved just before the action itself may explain pre-
response increases in dopamine such as those observed by Roitman et al. [10]. Second, we con-
sider a more direct role for dopamine in decision-making, specifically in setting the gain of a
diffusion-to-bound process of value integration. We show that both tonic and phasic fluctua-
tions in dopamine concentration produce what look like average ramping signals in dopamine
leading up to the time of decision. Third, we consider the possibility that the prolonged ramp-
ing signals observed by Howe et al. [14] may reflect an average reward-like signal that arises
Fig 5. Howe et al. [14] reported gradual increases in striatal dopamine concentration as rats approach reward in a maze. (A) Following an initial
warning click, a position-triggered tone indicates to rats which arm of the maze to visit in order to receive reward (upper). Changes in current (middle) and
dopamine concentration (lower) measured by FSCV in ventromedial striatum during a single T-maze trial. (B) Average dopamine concentration (±SEM)
reaches similar peak values on short vs. long trials for the same maze (upper) and for mazes of different length (lower). (C) Single-trial example showing a
close correspondence between the rat’s proximity to the goal (upper) and striatal dopamine concentration (lower). All figures adapted from [14], with
permission.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g005
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within the discounted reward framework. We show that the quasi-tonic signal suggested by
our analysis has just the right properties to explain the ramping phenomena observed in [14].
When will I act? Uncertainty about action timing within the actor-critic
Whether an animal faces a task in which it is free to respond as often and as quickly as it likes,
or is limited to a single response within an interval following a cue, it typically has at least some
freedom to choose its time of response. In the case of Roitman et al. [10] described above (Fig
4A), rats were free to lever press at a time of their own choosing following a cue marking the
start of a new trial. As reported in a number of similar studies, ramp-like increases in NAc dopa-
mine concentration which preceded the time of lever-pressing were observed (Fig 4C and 4D).
From a conventional TD perspective, phasic dopaminergic activity reflects a prediction
error. Such errors can be occasioned by changes in latent states associated with the subject’s
internal execution of the task, provided that there is some uncertainty associated with these
changes. Such uncertainty can be generated by two forms of ignorance: what the critic fails to
know about the actor’s choice of when to act, and what both actor and critic fail to know about
the passage of time [48, 49].
Consider first the critic’s knowledge about the temporal decisions of the actor (Fig 6). We
assume, reminiscent of studies by Libet and colleagues [50], and consistent with both patterns
of cortico-striatal connectivity [51–53] and observed patterns of discharge [54, 55], that inter-
nal information proximal to the action, such as some form of motor preparation, is communi-
cated to the critic via efference copy just before it is evident to the experimenter (a′′ in Fig 6).
This resolves any uncertainty the critic may have about the time of the impending action. The
question is what happens at the time that the actor makes its decision about the latency of lever
pressing following the initial cue. There are two natural possibilities. One is that the actor also
intimates its decision about when to act directly to the critic at that time, e.g., via a more indi-
rect form of efference copy (a′ in Fig 6) which could be transmitted via interacting cortico-
striatal loops or some more direct means [56]. This would then influence the critic’s predic-
tions about future events. The other is that the critic has no such privileged access to the actor’s
initial decision, implying that its predictions could be based only on its experience of down-
stream signals resulting from the actor’s choices.
A second, related issue concerns the realization of timing. If the actor communicates its
choice to the critic and the two share the same clock, then there seems to be little room for
Fig 6. Possible signals received by the critic about action timing.We assume that the actor selects an
action a (e.g., a latency to lever press) and communicates this choice to downstream pre-motor/motor areas
for implementation. We also assume that the critic receives an ‘indirect’ signal a′′ via efference copy from
downstream areas just prior to performance of the action itself. This latter signal resolves any uncertainty the
critic may have about the time of action. The critic may also receive a ‘direct’ signal a′ from the actor which
carries information about the selected action, and which is received immediately after the actor makes its
decision.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g006
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timing uncertainty to affect the critic’s predictions: regardless of whether the clock is fast, slow,
or variable, actor and critic will be in synchrony. On the other hand, if the actor does not spec-
ify an exact time of action, or its decisions are subject to additional sources of what the critic
will experience as uncontrolled variability (for instance if actor and critic employ different
clocks), timing uncertainty may play a role in the critic’s predictions and resulting prediction
errors [48, 49].
To explore these issues, we consider the same lever-pressing task described previously (Fig
3A), though with a state space that is augmented to reflect the assumption that the critic may
receive internal information about the lever press just before it occurs (Fig 3B). As before, an
initial cue (‘1’) is observed, prompting selection of a latency τ with which to press the lever.
After the selected duration τ, which may or may not be known by the critic, the animal transi-
tions to a state of preparedness to press, assumed to be communicated to the critic via efference
copy (‘2’; this corresponds to the time at which the critic receives signal a′′ in Fig 6). Note that
this latter state is distinct from that corresponding to consummation of the lever press itself
(‘3’) which is assumed to occur only after a further interval τpost. We set τpost = 500 ms to corre-
spond roughly with the time with which the so-called ‘readiness potential’ is detected prior to
self-initiated action [57, 58]. A reward of utility r = 1 is delivered on press completion. Comple-
tion of the lever press and reward delivery is followed by a fixed inter-trial interval τI = 30 s,
after which the process begins anew.
Actor. The role of the actor in this scenario is simply to make repeated choices about the
latency to lever press. For convenience, we assume that this choice is always made immediately
after presentation of the cue. What matters for present purposes is that either through stochas-
tic selection or stochastic execution, there will be a distribution of times that it takes for proxi-
mal news of the action to be reported to the critic via efference copy (i.e. the time at which a′′
in Fig 6 is transmitted to the critic). We therefore treat this efference copy time as a random
variable T which, for convenience, we assume to follow a gamma distribution
T  Gðk; yÞ; ð11Þ
where k and θ denote shape and scale parameters, respectively.
The source of randomness in T interacts with the source of the critic’s information about
the lever press. At one extreme of stochastic execution, the latency τ could be fixed and vari-
ability in T is generated by factors not under the actor’s control. We assume the other extreme,
in which the distributions of τ and T are identical, reflecting perfect implementation of the
actor’s stochastic choice.
Critic. The role of the critic is to learn the relative state values corresponding to the actor’s
policy. In the case where the critic only receives indirect information about the actor’s choices,
the critic will nevertheless have expectations about T based on past experience. Such expecta-
tions can be summarized in the form of a ‘prior’ distribution P(T). If the critic additionally
receives direct information about the actor’s choice, the critic can update its beliefs about when
engagement will occur based on this information. In the latter case, the critic’s expectations can
be summarized as a posterior distribution P(T|τ).
In either case, how the critic’s beliefs evolve will depend on the passage of time according to
the critic’s clock. We denote by t^ the critic’s perceived time since the initial cue is presented.
Within state 1, it will then be assumed that the critic estimates the relative values of ‘micro-
states’ f1; t^g. Whether or not the critic receives direct information about the actor’s choice, at
time t^ there are only two possibilities for the immediate future: either the critic receives notice
(a′′) that the lever press is imminent, T  t^ þ Dt^ , or it doesn’t, T > t^ þ Dt^ , where Dt^ denotes
some short slice of critic time. The probabilities of these events are conditional on T > t^ , since
Tamping Ramping: Explanations of Phasic Dopamine Signals in the Accumbens
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it is assumed that the critic has not yet received any such signal. The conditional probability of
the critic receiving notice of an imminent press in the immediate future PðT  t^ þ Dt^ jT > t^Þ
is closely related to the hazard function. Two general cases are of particular interest and are
explored below: T  Gð1; 1Þ, in which case the hazard function is constant (i.e. the conditional
probability of engagement at any time t^ following the cue is the same), and all other cases—we
focus on a Gð2; 1Þ distribution for convenience—where the hazard function changes over time
(Fig 7).
From these considerations, it is straightforward to write down expressions for the relative
values of states f1; t^g. In the case where the critic only receives information about choice indi-
rectly, these values satisfy
~V pðf1; t^gÞ ¼ PðT > t^ þ Dt^ jT > t^Þ ~V pðf1; t^ þ Dt^gÞ
þPðT  t^ þ Dt^ jT > t^Þ~V pð2Þ  rpDt^ ;
ð12Þ
which is a probability-weighted average of the relative values of remaining in state 1 and transi-
tioning to state 2. The case in which the actor directly communicates information about its
choice (a′) is slightly different due to the possibility of timing uncertainty. Based on the inter-
val-timing literature [59], we assume that the uncertainty about T increases with choices of lon-
ger latency. For convenience, we consider this conditional distribution to be Gaussian with a
standard deviation that scales with τ :
PðTjtÞ ¼ N ðT; t; s ¼ ktÞ; ð13Þ
where k is the scaling constant. The expression for relative values is identical in form to Eq
(12), but these now depend on τ:
~V pðf1; t^g; tÞ ¼ PðT > t^ þ Dt^ jT > t^ ; tÞ~V pðf1; t^ þ Dt^g; tÞ
þPðT  t^ þ Dt^ jT > t^ ; tÞ~V pð2Þ  rpDt^ :
ð14Þ
In this case, we additionally consider that there is likely some delay between cue onset and the
Fig 7. Constant and variable hazard functions. (A) Two different gamma densities of the time T at which the critic receives notification of an impending
lever press. (B) Corresponding hazard functions hðt^Þ ¼limDt^!0fPðT  t^ þ Dt^ jT > t^ Þ=Dt^g. Note that the hazard function is constant in the Gð1; 1Þ case, but
increases with time in the Gð2; 1Þ case.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g007
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time at which the critic receives information about the actor’s choice. Assuming that the actor
makes its decision immediately at cue onset (t = 0) and denoting by  the delay in intimating
this decision to the critic, the relative value of the initial state of ignorance is
~V pðf1; 0gÞ ¼ rpþ
Z
t
dt pðtÞ~V pðf1; g; tÞ: ð15Þ
Whether or not the actor directly reports its choice to the critic, the relative values of states 2
and 3 are straightforward since it is assumed that subsequent state transitions are independent
of choice, and their occupation times (τpost , τI) deterministic. A more general version of the
model would also include uncertainty regarding occupation times τpost and τI but we ignore
this here since our main focus of interest is on the events occurring between cue and lever
press.
TD errors and dopamine concentration. Given the critic’s relative state values, we are
particularly interested in TD errors and their dopaminergic instantiation. Note that TD errors
are inevitable in all cases we consider, either due to the random nature of T in the case of indi-
rect communication, or due to timing uncertainty in the case where there is additional direct
communication of τ. Under the conventional average reward formulation described above, TD
errors take the form [60]:
dt ¼ rt þ ~V pðstþ1Þ  ~V pðstÞ  rp
¼ d pt  rp;
ð16Þ
where dpt is assumed to constitute the phasic component of the error signal reﬂected in phasic
dopaminergic activity, and average reward rate ρπ is assumed to be reﬂected in a constant,
tonic level of dopamine. For the moment, we ignore the tonic component of the error term, ρπ,
and only report signals arising from the varying phasic signal dpt . Changes in dopamine concen-
tration Δ[DA] are therefore modelled by convolving dpt—either symmetrically or asymmetri-
cally scaled—with the DRF, as per Eq (4).
Uncertainty resolution, TD errors, and the pre-response dopamine signal
Given the models described in the previous section, we consider results from three different
cases: two in which the critic only receives information about the lever press indirectly, and
one in which the critic additionally receives direct information from the actor. In each case, we
consider the effect of the critic receiving notice of impending action at different times—T = {1,
3, 10} seconds—on the TD error dpt , and evaluate the resulting change in dopamine concentra-
tion Δ[DA] under both symmetric and asymmetric encoding assumptions. Results for all the
cases are summarized together in Fig 8.
Indirect communication only. We first consider the case in which the critic receives only
indirect information about the actor’s choice. As mentioned above, there are two general cases
of interest: where the hazard function is constant (i.e. the conditional probability of engage-
ment at any time t^ following the cue is the same), and where it changes over time.
In the case of a constant hazard function, corresponding to T  Gð1; 1Þ, the size of TD
error occurring on transition to the state of preparedness does not vary with latency (Fig 8A,
upper). This is precisely because the conditional probability of this transition does not vary
over time. Note also that after an initial positive TD error, the error signal remains at a constant
negative value between the time of cue presentation and the time at which the critic receives
efference copy. This constant negative TD error is again a consequence of the ﬂat hazard func-
tion. Hazard-related suppression in the spiking activity of dopamine neurons before the
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occurrence of variably timed (external) reward-related events has been observed in a number
of experimental studies [61–63], consistent with reporting of such a negative TD error. The ini-
tial positive TD error in response to the cue reﬂects a positive average value for each trial. Even
though the TD error generated in response to the critic’s receiving notice of impending action
is constant, differences are observed as to how dopamine concentrations [DA] change for
Fig 8. Pattern of prediction errors depends on the nature of communication between actor and critic. In each case (A–C), we consider signals for
three particular times of T at which the critic receives notice of the impending lever press: 1 s (blue), 3 s (red), and 10 s (green). Parts of the signal where there
is overlap between two or more different times of T are plotted in black. In each case, we plot TD errors (top), TD errors convolved with symmetric kernel
(middle), and TD errors convolved with ‘asymmetric’ kernel (bottom). (A) Indirect communication (a′′) only, T  Gð1;1Þ. (B) Indirect communication (a′′) only,
T  Gð2; 1Þ. (C) Both direct and indirect communication (a′; a′′), T  Gð2;1Þ, with timing uncertainty (uncertainty scaling constant k = 0.1). Vertical dashed
lines indicate times of observable events, i.e. cue presentation (t = 0, black) and lever presses (t = T+τpost, coloured). Note the difference in y-axis scaling
between (A;B) and (C). Model parameters: a = −1, b = 0, r = 1, τpost = 0.5 s, τI = 30 s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g008
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different latencies (Fig 8A, middle and lower). For example, on short-latency trials, TD errors
in response to cue onset and receipt of efference copy can combine to produce a larger peak
[DA] signal (Fig 8A, lower).
In the Gð2; 1Þ case, the hazard rate is not constant. Then, efference-related TD errors
decrease with longer latencies (Fig 8B, upper). This is due to the monotonic increase in proba-
bility that the lever press will occur with the passage of time—the event is increasingly
expected. The decrease in TD error for longer latencies is mirrored in a decrease in the peak
[DA] signal (Fig 8B, middle and lower). Interestingly, exactly this pattern of decreasing TD-
related activity with time has recently been reported in dopaminergic neurons in response to
presentation of a movement trigger signal, where presentation times were randomly drawn
from a uniform distribution, while monkeys performed a reaching task [63].
Direct and indirect communication. In the case that the critic additionally receives initial
information about the actor’s choice of latency, exactly the opposite trend is observed in TD
errors occurring just before pressing: they increasewith latency (Fig 8C, upper). This is due to
the assumption that the critic is more uncertain about the time of engagement for longer choices
of τ. Conversely, TD errors occurring just after the cue, corresponding to the time at which the
critic receives initial information about the actor’s choice, decreasewith τ. In particular, choice of
a relatively long latency can generate a pronounced negative TD error due to the low relative
value of long trials. There is in all cases, however, an initial, brief positive prediction error corre-
sponding to the positive value of the critic’s state of ignorance prior to receiving information
about the actor’s choice (c.f. Eq (15)). Again, the pattern in TD errors is mirrored in the resulting
[DA] signal, with the decrease in [DA] for a long τ being strongly dependent on whether the
DRF is assumed to be symmetric or asymmetric (Fig 8C, middle and lower).
It is this case, especially when positive and negative TD errors are differentially scaled (Fig
8C, lower), that seems to offer the best qualitative fit to the results in [10] that are shown in Fig
4. Fig 9 shows simulated average dopamine concentrations, where the averages are aligned to
the various key events in a trial (and separated by latency). Not only do we see a similar signal
produced by presentation of the cue (Fig 9A), but we see a qualitative match in press-aligned
average signal for short- and long- latency trials (Fig 9B and 9C). Thus, on short-latency trials,
we see a pronounced ramping which peaks at the time of the press (Fig 9B). Furthermore, we
observe no difference in peak signal when aligned to either cue or press events (Fig 9B, inset).
On long-latency trials, just as seen in Roitman et al.’s data, ramping is somewhat less pro-
nounced but similarly begins prior to the press and peaks around the time of press completion
Fig 9. Simulated cue- and press-aligned changes in dopamine concentration, for comparison with Fig 4. Simulated average changes (±SEM) in
dopamine concentration for the case where the critic receives both direct and indirect communication, asymmetric convolution of TD errors. (A) Cue-aligned,
all trials. (B) Press-aligned, short-latency (<5 s) trials. (C) Press-aligned, long-latency (>5 s) trials. Insets show average peak changes (+SEM) in dopamine
around the time of cue presentation and time of lever press. Number of simulated trials N = 1000, realizations of T drawn Gð2;1Þ. Model parameters as
before: a = −1, b = 0, r = 1, k = 0.1, τpost = 0.5 s, τI = 30 s.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g009
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(Fig 9C). Furthermore, unlike short-latency trials, the peak [DA] signal is significantly larger
around the time of the press than at the time of the cue (Fig 9C, inset).
Amore direct role for dopamine: Setting the gain of value accumulation
Our first possible account of ramping, the TD account of pre-response signals described above,
assigns dopamine a passive role in decision-making: increases in dopamine reflect a latent state
transition arising from a decision to act which has already been made. However, experimental
evidence suggests that accumbens dopamine could also play a more causal role. For example,
Phillips et al. [9] found that electrically-evoked dopamine transients in NAc increased the
probability that rats would lever press for cocaine immediately afterwards, further commenting
that videotaped behavioural records showed that stimulation led to immediate changes in
behaviour, notably behavioural sequences up to and including lever approach. Relatedly,
Nicola [64] found that blocking dopamine signalling in NAc impaired rats’ ability to approach
and press a lever for food, but only when animals were likely to have to re-engage with the task
by following a novel sequence of actions to approach the lever. Such findings have led to the
suggestion that accumbens dopamine is necessary for ‘flexible approach’ [64]. In fact, models
associating phasic dopamine with a TD error signal have long considered a dual role for dopa-
mine in which indirect effects on behaviour, involving learning, are accompanied by direct
ones [1, 65–67]. We next explore a second potential mechanism for ramping signals. In partic-
ular, we show that a particular decision-making scheme which couples dopamine directly to
the decision process also generates dopamine ramps.
A rich vein of work in psychology and neuroscience revolves around the idea that the brain
implements some version of the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), a sometimes optimal
procedure for two-alternative forced-choice decisions under uncertainty [68, 69]. While the
SPRT and its close associates are usually considered in relation to decision making under state
uncertainty, as when there is doubt about whether the overall motion of a random dot field is
to the left or right [70], such models have also been applied with some success to memory-
based [71] or value-based [72] decisions in which sensory information is absent or unambigu-
ous. We consider the possibility that this arises from accumulation of value information, in
which information stored in synapses is read out via spike trains in a temporally extended
manner. A prominent realization of the SPRT is the so-called drift-diffusion model (DDM)
which we describe in detail below [68, 69, 71, 73–75]. In particular, this can be shown to be a
suitable abstraction of a particular sort of neural circuit involving competition between two (or
sometimes more) populations of neurons representing the choices [73, 76, 77].
One of the earliest computational suggestions for the role of dopamine and other catechol-
amines was that by influencing the excitability of neurons [78], they could influence gain con-
trol in such circuits, and thereby influence the course of decision-making [79, 80]. Such models
were originally conceived of in terms of cortical decision-making circuits; however, for
instance, Frank’s [81] neural network model of the basal ganglia assumes that dopamine con-
trols the relative excitability of direct (‘Go’) and indirect (‘Nogo’) pathways via different dopa-
mine receptor subtypes, thereby influencing both the propensity and latency to act.
Specifically, higher levels of dopamine shift the balance of activity in favour of the ‘Go’ path-
way, leading to a greater propensity to act and faster reaction times. Dopaminergic modulation
of excitability in this model can also be interpreted in terms of gain-setting [81].
Here we bring together these two ideas—of an accumulative decision-making process and
dopaminergic gain control—to explore how a more direct coupling between dopamine and
decision-making may explain ramping dopamine signals in striatum.
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Decision-making process. In the DDM, (differential) evidence x(t) is accumulated
according to
dx ¼ Adt þ cdW; xð0Þ ¼ 0; ð17Þ
where the constant drift A = Q1 − Q2 represents the average increase in evidence supporting the
correct choice per unit time (Q1 could represent the value of pressing a lever andQ2 the value of
the null action—no lever press—for example), and cdW represents white noise which is Gauss-
ian-distributed with μ = 0, σ2 = c2 dt. In the free-response case of interest here, the process termi-
nates (i.e. decision is made) when x reaches a ﬁxed threshold ±z. Analytic expressions relating
error rate and decision times to DDM parameters can be derived in this simple case [73].
We consider the slightly augmented DDM in which the drift and diffusion (i.e. noise
strength) constants vary over time [82]:
dx ¼ gðtÞ½Adt þ cdW; xð0Þ ¼ 0; ð18Þ
where g(t) is the time-varying gain which controls the drift and noise, and which we assume
directly reﬂects dopamine concentration.
Dopamine dynamics. We consider the additive effects of two sorts of fluctuation in g(t):
tonic and phasic. In the tonic case, dopamine is assumed to fluctuate in an autocorrelated man-
ner around some constant level (Fig 10A). In particular, we assume that g(t) follows an Orn-
stein-Uhlenbeck process
dg ¼ kðy gÞdt þ sdW; gð0Þ ¼ y; ð19Þ
where θ is the long-term mean of the process, κ controls the rate of mean reversion, and σ con-
trols the variance of the white noise process.
In the phasic case, we consider the addition of a more dramatic change in dopamine con-
centration, notionally driven by TD-related phasic activity of dopamine cells occasioned either
by an external cue or, as in the previous section, by a latent event internal to the animal (Fig
10B). Thus, tonic fluctuations are again assumed, as per Eq (19), but now a large phasic
increase in dopamine is added to this signal. In particular, we assume phasic increases are
Fig 10. Simulated tonic and phasic dopamine fluctuations. (A) Simulated tonic fluctuations of dopamine concentration [DA] around a constant level
(horizontal dashed line). (B) Addition of a comparatively large phasic fluctuation in dopamine concentration due to a TD error occurring at t = 1 s (vertical
dashed line).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g010
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driven by a TD response of random magnitude h drawn from a Gaussian distribution
h  N ðmTD; s2TDÞ: ð20Þ
As before, the TD response is converted to a transient change in extracellular dopamine con-
centration via the alpha function ‘DRF’ described in Eq (4).
Tonic and phasic dopamine fluctuations produce average ramping
signals
Tonic fluctuations. Fig 11A shows a single-trial example of how the decision-making var-
iable x(t) and dopamine concentration g(t) co-evolve in the case of tonic dopamine fluctuations
(upper and lower plots, respectively). Even though dopamine fluctuations here are driven
purely by noise, averaging over dopamine signals aligned to the time of decision (i.e. threshold-
crossing) reveals a clear ramping of this average signal towards decision time (Fig 11B). This
averaging phenomenon is due to threshold-crossing events being more likely to occur when
[DA] (i.e. the gain) is high, and also to the fact that the [DA] time series is autocorrelated.
Phasic fluctuations. Unsurprisingly, the addition of strong phasic fluctuations, notionally
driven by TD-related activity, also generates an average ramping signal (Fig 12A). Of note in
this case is the negative correlation between the magnitude of the TD response h and latency
(i.e. time of threshold crossing; Fig 12B). This is in accord with the finding that the size of pha-
sic responses of dopaminergic cells to a trial-start cue in a reward-related task is negatively cor-
related with reaction time [83] (Fig 12C).
Dopamine fluctuations and motivational state. While an obvious source of phasic fluc-
tuations in dopamine concentration is the TD-related phasic activity of dopamine cells, the
origins of the tonic fluctuations assumed here are perhaps less clear. Although these could
simply be attributed to ‘intrinsic noise’, a psychologically richer possibility is that such fluctua-
tions could be at least partially driven by changing motivational states. Indeed, Satoh et al.
Fig 11. Tonic fluctuations generate average ramping signals. (A) Single trial example showing evolution of the decision variable x(t) (upper) and
dopamine concentration [DA] (lower) over time. (B) Average [DA] (±SEM) aligned to time of threshold crossing. Number of simulated trials N = 1000. [DA]
process parameters: dt = 0.01 s, θ = 1, κ = 0.01, σ = 0.1. DDM parameters: A = 1, c = 1, z = 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g011
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[83] suggested that the relationship between phasic DA activity and response latency that they
observed was driven by changes in motivation. Returning briefly to the average-reward RL
framework, we can consider what to expect in terms of dopaminergic activity and response
latencies in different motivational states. Taking the lever-pressing case of Fig 3B, and a critic
that only receives indirect information about the actor’s choice of τ, we now assume that the
utility of a fixed reward depends on motivational state. Further, it is assumed that the actor
selects a latency τ with a probability which depends on its relative Q-value via the softmax
function: PðtÞ / exp ðb~Qpð1; tÞÞ, β = 1. In this case, it is straightforward to show that the
average utility rate and magnitude of prediction error in response to a trial-start cue will be
positively correlated (Fig 13A), either predictively given model-based calculations, or through
experience of model-free ones [84]. Furthermore, it will again be the case that latencies are
anticorrelated with the magnitude of prediction errors (Fig 13B). This example not only illus-
trates a possible role for motivational state in driving changes in dopamine levels and corre-
lated changes in behaviour, but ﬂags the difﬁculty of disentangling the inﬂuences of phasic
and tonic dopamine on behaviour. Indeed, within the particular implementation of the aver-
age-reward RL model suggested by Niv et al. [39], the observed effect on latency is really deter-
mined by the tonic level of dopamine, which, in turn, is treated as being mechanistically
independent of phasic dopamine. However, since changes in tonic level are correlated with
changes in phasic response, what amounts to a spurious correlation between phasic activity
and latency is observed.
Ramping as state prediction
We now consider a third account of dopamine ramps based on a new model of discounted vig-
our. Incorporating the observations and suggestions of Howe et al. [14], together with a par-
tially free-operant experiment of his own, Berke and colleagues (personal communication,
[85]) suggested that the concentration of dopamine measured by FSCV in the accumbens
might be strongly influenced by the discounted value function V(s) of Eq (1). This will show
evidence of ramping towards final goal states when the discount factor is less than 1, consistent
with the observations of Howe et al. (Fig 5). We describe this signal as being quasi-tonic since,
Fig 12. Phasic fluctuations generate ramping signals. (A) Average dopamine concentration [DA] (±SEM) aligned to time of threshold crossing. Number of
simulated trials N = 1000. (B) Time of threshold-crossing (latency) is negatively correlated with size of TD error h in the model (ρ = −0.43). (C) Similarly,
response magnitude of dopaminergic cells to a trial-start cue (upper plots, showing population response histograms by behavioural reaction time, RT) is
negatively correlated with a monkey’s reaction time (lower) in an instrumental, reward-related task. Adapted from [83], with permission. [DA] process
parameters: dt = 0.01 s, θ = 1, κ = 0.01, σ = 0.1. DDM parameters: A = 2, c = 0.1, z = 5. TD errors: mTD ¼ 4;s2TD ¼ 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g012
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when there is no reward, it is a form of integral of the TD prediction error, which is phasic.
However, one should bear in mind that when the state changes abruptly, the value can change
abruptly too. The key question, though, is why we should expect to see any such quasi-tonic
signal in this context?
We consider the possibility that this signal is the equivalent in the discounted case of the
average reward ρ (for convenience, in this section, we omit the superscript π) which, as we
have seen, has previously been argued to be (a) the comparison point for the phasic prediction
error or the immediate reward; (b) the spur to instrumental vigour; and (c) represented by
tonic levels of dopamine [39].
Indeed, consider afresh an apparent inconsistency in the definition of the TD prediction
error between the cases of average and discounted reward. In the average case, the phasic com-
ponent of the full prediction error (c.f. Eq (16)), now denoted δA(st), is
dAðstÞ ¼ rðstÞ þ ~V ðstþ1Þ  ~V ðstÞ; ð21Þ
and we expect the mean of this over the long run to be the overall mean reward rate
hdAðstÞi¼ r; ð22Þ
which is a tonic signal that therefore acts as a comparison point for the phasic prediction error.
Eqs (21) and (22) can also be seen as arising from the observation that the relative values ~V are
expected undiscounted sums of the differences between r(st) and ρ. Unfortunately, even if the
relationship in Eq (22) actually holds, ρ, because it is stationary, is formally hard to measure
with FSCV, whose measurements are typically referenced to a potentially ever-changing
baseline.
By contrast, in the discounted case, the phasic prediction error δγ(st) is normally written as
dgðstÞ ¼ rðstÞ þ gV gðstþ1Þ  V gðstÞ; ð23Þ
Fig 13. Correlation of average utility rate and size of TD error. (A) As the utility r of a reward increases, putatively from a change in motivational state, both
the average utility rate ρ (assumed to be signalled by tonic dopamine) and the size of TD error d pt in response to a trial-start cue (phasic dopamine) increase.
(B) A negative correlation between TD error and latency is observed. Here, we again assume the lever-pressing task depicted in Fig 3B. The critic is
assumed to receive only indirect information about the actor’s choices. Model parameters: a = −0.05, b = 0, τpost = 0.5 s, τI = 0 s, β = 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g013
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now writing the discounted value function as Vγ(s), and is expected on average to be 0:
hdgðstÞi ¼ 0:
However, two considerations encourage us to write this expression slightly differently, with an
undiscounted phasic TD prediction error just as in Eq (21):
dAgðstÞ ¼ rðstÞ þ V gðstþ1Þ  V gðstÞ; ð24Þ
which should, on average, take the value
hdAgðstÞi ¼ ð1 gÞhV gðstþ1Þi: ð25Þ
Here, (1 − γ)hVγ(st+1)i, by analogy with the truly stationary signal ρ, would be represented as a
quasi-tonic signal which acts as a target for a phasic TD prediction error signal that involves a
discounted value function. Assuming that this baseline signal is represented in a quasi-tonic
concentration signal would thus licence ramping.
The two considerations that encourage this interpretation of phasic and quasi-tonic dopa-
mine signals are: (i) continuity between average and discounted cases as γ! 1; (ii) something
of particular pertinence in the current context, namely the determinants of vigour for dis-
counted problems. We discuss these in turn. There is also a rough analogy with the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation [86, 87], but as this requires considering continuous space and
time, as well as a different sort of transition structure, we do not discuss it further.
Continuity. It is well known that, in convenient circumstances, there are very close links
between the infinite horizon average and discounted reward cases for dynamic programming
and control [42, 86]. For instance, for a large class of suitable MDPs, there is a minimum dis-
count factor 0 γ < 1 such that the optimal policy for the discounted problem with discount
γ> γ is also optimal for the average case. Thus, we might expect the prediction errors and
putative phasic and tonic signals to be continuous as γ! 1. This is patently not true of the sin-
gle Eq (23), compared with the pair Eqs (21 and 22).
However, it is well known that this can be repaired by considering the term in Eq (25) in the
limit that γ! 1:
limg!1 ð1 gÞV gðsÞf g ¼ limg!1
limN!1
PN1
k¼0 g
krðskÞ
 
s0¼s
limN!1
PN1
k¼0 gk
;
where the denominator arises from the fact that 1þ gþ g2 þ ::: ¼ 1=ð1gÞ,
¼ limg!1limN!1
PN1
k¼0 g
krðskÞ
 
s0¼sPN1
k¼0 gk
:
Thus, if the limits can be swapped (see [86] for conditions),
¼ limN!1limg!1
PN1
k¼0 g
krðskÞ
 
s0¼sPN1
k¼0 gk
¼ limN!1
1
N
XN1
k¼0
rðskÞ
* +
s0¼s
8<
:
9=
;
¼ r;
and so a formal continuity as γ! 1 does arise between the two pairs of phasic and tonic repre-
sentations Eqs (21 and 22) and Eqs (24 and 25).
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Discounted vigour. As mentioned above, one of the main suggestions about the tonic
release of dopamine associated with ρ is that it should determine the vigour of responding.
This is shown in the average reward model discussed above by the influence of this factor in
the latency of Eq (10) that maximises the relative value ~Q of Eq (9).
In the discounted case, the equivalent Qγ equation to Eq (9) is
Qgðst; tÞ ¼ cðtÞ þ rðstÞ þ gtV gðstþtÞ
¼ cðtÞ þ rðstÞ þ V gðstþtÞ  ð1 gtÞV gðstþtÞ;
showing that the opportunity cost −ρτ encouraging quick actions has been replaced by the ever
more negative value of −(1 − γτ)Vγ(st+τ) as τ increases. As γ! 1, (1 − γτ) can usefully be written
as τ(1 − γ) + O((1 − γ)2), so the portion of Qγ(s, τ) that depends on τ becomes
Qgðs; tÞ ¼ Kþ cðtÞ þ gtV gðstþtÞ
’ Kþ cðtÞ  tð1 gÞV gðstþtÞ;
and a comparison with Eq (9) shows again how (1 − γ)Vγ(st+τ) in the discounted reward model
plays an equivalent role to ρ in the average model. The equations above extend this to the non-
limiting case of γ< 1.
A quasi-tonic dopamine signal
Insight into discounted vigour comes from numerical calculations of the optimal latencies τ as
a function of γ and for different values a< 0 that control the hyperbolic cost of vigour cðtÞ ¼ at
in two cases: a terminating chain with Vγ(st+τ) = 1, 8τ, γ (roughly as in [14]) and a continuing
chain as in Fig 3. Fig 14A shows optimal latencies τ in the terminating case. Generally, as γ
decreases, the faster the weight given to future value Vγ(st+τ) decays with time, encouraging
quicker latencies. This tendency is balanced by the greater cost of acting quickly that is then
incurred. In fact, one can show that there there is a limit on the cost of acting of amin = 4/(e
2 log
γ) below which there is no solution for τ — crudely, the cost of acting quickly deems such a
long latency that the resulting discounted value of the reward (from Vγ(st+τ) = 1) is insufﬁcient
to warrant action at all (Fig 14A, solid red line).
Fig 14. Optimal latency τ* as a function of discount factor γ and cost a. The optimal latency τ* tends to decrease as either the discount factor γ or the
cost of acting quickly a decrease. (A) Terminating SMDP, Vγ(st + τ) = 1, 8τ, γ. There exists a limit on the cost of acting alim below which there is no solution for
τ* (solid red line). (B) Difference between the optimal τ* for the cases of continuing and terminating SMDP for the case that τI = 30 s. As τI is large relative to
−1/logγ, there is little difference Δτ* from the terminating case. (C) Difference between the optimal τ* for the cases of continuing and terminating SMDP for
the case that τI = 1 s. In this case, future rewards hasten lever pressing as seen in the more prevalent decreases in τ*.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g014
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Fig 14B and 14C show differences in τ in the continuing compared to the terminating case.
In the continuing SMDP, the result of pressing the lever includes a further opportunity to press
the lever (without which, the infinite horizon average reward ρ would formally be 0). When the
inter-trial interval τI is large relative to −1/log γ, there is little difference from the terminating
case (Fig 14B); however, when it is not, the prospect of accelerating not only the immediate
reward but also future rewards further hastens lever pressing, visible in greater decreases in τ
compared to the terminating case (Fig 14C).
Given the preceding analysis, it is straightforward to show that a quasi-tonic dopamine signal
reflecting the quantity (1 − γ)Vγ(st+1) would lead to the sort of ramping observed by Howe et al.
[14] in their spatial reward task (c.f. Fig 5) for γ< 1. Indeed, just as observed by Howe et al.,
[DA] gradually ramps up as the goal is approached and peaks at the same value regardless of the
time taken to reach the goal or the distance travelled to reach it, assuming a fixed reward size
(Fig 15A). Further, as observed experimentally, increasing the reward size leads peak [DA] to
increase (Fig 15B) and, given a lack of progress towards the goal—for instance if the agent
remains stationary or moves away from the goal—[DA] remains approximately stationary or
decreases, respectively, as observed by Howe et al. on such trials (Fig 15C). One should note in
this latter case that the single-trial examples shown by Howe et al. find dopamine concentrations
tracking spatial proximity remarkably closely (see Fig 5C), while convolution of (1 − γ)Vγ(st+1)
with the DRF that we have assumed leads to a signal which looks comparatively over-smoothed
(Fig 15C, right). However, given the heterogeneous nature of striatal dopamine release [88],
how rapidly [DA] is observed to change may well depend on the exact positioning of the vol-
tammetric sensor. Examination of further single-trial examples could help clarify this issue.
Fig 15. Simulations replicate Howe et al. results. (A) [DA] gradually increases as the goal is approached, peaking at the same values whether different
times were taken to traverse a maze of fixed length, or in mazes of different lengths with a fixed magnitude of reward (time is taken as a proxy for distance in
the latter case). (B) Peak [DA] is greater for larger rewards. (C) [DA] tracks proximity to the goal. In this example, goal proximity over time is non-
monotonically increasing (left), and we plot both the corresponding scaled value quantity (1 − γ)Vγ(st + 1) (middle) and the convolution of the latter with the
DRF which yields [DA] (right). Parameters: γ = 0.98, r = 1 (unless indicated otherwise).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622.g015
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Discussion
The observation of ramp-like increases in dopamine concentration within the nucleus accum-
bens appears to pose a challenge to existing computational accounts of dopamine’s role. Here,
we explored three different explanations for such signals: (a) resolution of uncertainty about
the timing of action within an actor-critic, leading to a prediction error shortly preceding the
action itself; (b) positive correlations between the time of action and dopamine levels generated
by dopaminergic gain control of the decision-making process; and (c) a quasi-tonic signal
replacing the average reward in the exponentially discounted setting. These explanations, along
with the possibility mentioned earlier that release from dopamine axons might be directly occa-
sioned by a form of spillover from cortico-striatal activity, are by no means mutually exclusive.
This prompts a need for experimental test.
Note that the various cases of ramps may be caused by different, or combined, mechanisms.
Indeed, the possible explanations that we considered mainly in the context of pre-response tran-
sients, in which ramp-like signals are observed leading up to completion of an instrumental
action, were somewhat distinct from the explanation offered for ramping in the spatial reward
task, in which the subjects are already engaged in acting. Nevertheless, the account of discounted
vigour suggested in the latter case should be relevant in all contexts where some degree of dis-
counting is probable (i.e. γ< 1), such as in the temporally-extended tasks considered here, since
it is in this case that the quantity (1 − γ)Vγ(st+1) should be visible as a ramping signal.
TD accounts of pre-response dopamine signals
What TD accounts of pre-response dopamine signals predict depends on the assumptions
made about the relationship between actor and critic. We considered three possibilities associ-
ated with different predictions of how a TD error occurring just prior to pressing, and the
resulting change in dopamine concentration, should change as response latencies increase:
remain constant, decrease, or increase.
The model in which the critic receives both direct and indirect information, but suffers from
timing uncertainty, yielded results most consistent with the experimental data reported by
Roitman et al. [10]. In particular, this case replicated the observation that peak dopamine con-
centration around time of pressing was larger than at time of cue for long latency trials. This
result relied on the assumption that the critic’s uncertainty about the time of action increases
with choices of longer press latencies. This is consistent with the finding, in the equivalent Pav-
lovian circumstance, that the responses of dopaminergic neurons to a cue predicting reward
delivery after a long delay are smaller than responses to cues predicting shorter delays; con-
versely, dopamine responses to the reward itself increase with longer delays [62, 89], a finding
that indeed has been suggested to arise through timing uncertainty.
This finding is apparently opposite, though, to an observation also mentioned above. This is
that for the case of a single, non-exponential hazard function, which mandates a range of possi-
ble times at which a reward-related cue might be presented, relatively late presentations inspire
smaller dopamine responses than early ones [63]. An obvious explanation of this finding is that
as time goes by, presentation of the cue is more and more likely, and so less and less unex-
pected. This does not contradict our finding, which depends on many possible hazard func-
tions, one for each choice of lever-press latency.
Two assumptions in the proposed TD account merit further comment. Firstly, while we
assumed that the actor’s choice of when to press the lever immediately follows cue presenta-
tion, one can imagine variability in when the actor makes decisions about when to act. For
example, it might be that the animal initially fails to notice the cue, or is otherwise engaged
(even in instrumental leisure; [40]) when the cue arrives, only later resolving to engage with
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the lever. Secondly, and perhaps relatedly, while it was convenient to assume that latencies τ,
and therefore times T, follow a gamma distribution, the reported distribution of press times
appears to have heavier tails than we would expect if they were drawn from a single gamma
distribution. Thus, Roitman et al. reported mean response times of 1.2 s and 26.2 s for short-
latency (83%) and long-latency (17%) trials, respectively. Closer examination of the empirical
response distribution in such studies would be of interest for future work.
A more general problem for a TD account of pre-response signals is that while there is
abundant evidence of a systematic temporal relationship between the time at which a cue indi-
cating reward availability is presented and subsequent phasic activity in dopaminergic neurons,
there is little or no evidence of such a relationship between the time of the phasic response and
when a subsequent instrumental action—necessary to obtain the reward—is emitted. For
example, Ljungberg et al. [90] found that when monkeys were exposed to cues that predicted
when they could obtain food by reaching into a box, activity of dopaminergic neurons was
time-locked to the predictive cue rather than movement onset. Whether this is also true for the
timescale and nature of rodent movements is unclear. Even in monkeys, Romo and Schultz
[91] reported gradual increases in the firing rates of some putative dopaminergic cells (12 out
of 104 recorded) up to 1500 before onset of self-initiated arm movements to obtain food. How-
ever, this slow change in activity does not resemble the sort of bursting activity that might be
associated with a phasic TD signal.
Suggestively, striatal (and cortical) neurons in monkeys show various patterns, including
ramp-like increases in activity, before self-initiated movements [55, 92, 93]. Similarly, some
neurons in rat ventral striatum show anticipatory increases in activity when approaching or
waiting for food delivery [94, 95]. Furthermore, simultaneous electrophysiological and FSCV
recordings from the same electrode have revealed that changes in dopamine concentration and
activity of specific subsets of accumbal cells can be temporally correlated [96, 97]. Suppression
of phasic activity in VTA dopaminergic cells appears to disrupt such time-locked activity, per-
haps indicating that it is phasic activity of dopaminergic cells which drives such correlated
activity [98]. So at the mechanistic level at least, there are multiple possibilities for the origins
of pre-response signals beyond phasic dopaminergic activity: they may reflect the sort of slow
change in activity of dopaminergic neurons observed in [91], or they may reflect increased
dopamine release instigated more directly by the activity of other cells, such as reflected in cor-
tico-striatal inputs.
A range of previous work has considered the vagaries of the representation and processing
of time. We noted that possible sources of uncertainty included partial observability of the
actor’s choices in the case where the critic does not have direct access to this information, and
possible timing uncertainty in the case where it does. Implications of partial observability for
TD models of dopamine have been explored in previous work, notably by Daw and colleagues
[48], though that did not address the possibility of partial observability arising between distinct
internal agencies, nor the possible relevance to self-initiated action envisaged here. The same
study and a number of others [48, 49, 99–101] have addressed the issue of the representation of
time, and how this representation may influence timing uncertainty (see [102] for a recent
review). The implications for TD (and indeed different models of discounting) of the possible
distinction between the animal’s ‘internal’ time and the experimenter’s ‘conventional’ time
have been worked out in detail by Nakahara and Kaveri [49]; we also considered the possibility
of separate internal clocks for actor and critic. Additional complexity, which we leave to future
work, arises from the putative connection between dopamine and the speed of an internal
clock, as inferred, for example, from the effects of dopamine manipulations on behaviour in
interval-timing tasks [102, 103].
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Dopaminergic gain control
We showed that ramping dopamine signals can be generated by a mechanistic decision-making
model in which dopamine sets the gain of value-based accumulation. Furthermore, we saw
that this direct coupling of dopamine to decision-making could generate a negative correlation
between the size of TD error and decision time, consistent with the experimental observation
that a larger phasic response of dopaminergic cells to a start cue is associated with a shorter
latency of behavioural response [83].
This route to ramping signals is primarily statistical, arising from trial-averaging. On any
individual trial, dopamine ramping towards the time of decision may or may not occur, though
it is certainly more typical when dopamine fluctuations incorporate a strong, TD-related phasic
component. To the best of our knowledge, whether pre-response transients in NAc reliably
precede the animal’s response on individual trials, or may reflect trial-averaging, is unknown.
Mathematical analysis of the time-varying gain DDM that we described is given by Moehlis
et al. [82] and, indeed, the idea that dopamine could set this gain follows directly from previous
work by Cohen and colleagues on catecholaminergic gain control [79, 80]. For example, Shea-
Brown et al. [80] suggested that noradrenergic activity of cells in the locus coeruleus may help
to optimize decision-making by adjusting the gain of an integrative decision process. Further-
more, they showed that their model could replicate the experimental finding that phasic
responses of the locus coeruleus correlate more closely with time of behavioural response than
with time of stimulus onset in a decision-making task [104].
Also of relevance is the biologically-detailed neural network model of the basal ganglia pro-
posed by Frank [81] in which dopamine modulates the balance between direct and indirect path-
ways. Ratcliff and Frank [105] have recently explored the links between the latter’s neural
network model and more abstract diffusion models, though without exploring a possible direct
role for dopamine in the latter. Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider that, depending on the
form of the DDM used to fit the data, dopaminergic modulation of a temporally-extended deci-
sion process may be manifest in different parameters. For example, a positive correlation between
increased tonic dopamine levels and faster responding may also be captured by the assumption
that dopamine modulates the threshold of a DDMwhere the gain is fixed [106], rather than
modulating the gain under a fixed threshold. Additionally, one may consider potential effects of
dopamine not only on the latency of response, but also on which choice is made, for instance due
to asymmetries in how dopamine modulates direct and indirect pathways (M.J. Frank, personal
communication; [107]). More generally, it would be of interest to know whether dopamine
ramps would also be observed in Frank’s comparatively detailed model of the basal ganglia.
Discounted vigour
We reconciled an apparent inconsistency between the definitions of TD errors in the cases of
average and discounted reward via an analysis in which ramp-like signals would be expected to
emerge. In particular, we suggested that the quantity (1 − γ)hVγ(st+1)i in the discounted reward
model plays an equivalent role to the average reward rate ρ in the average reward model. Since
values often (though not always) change modestly as a result of the passage of time, this signal
is quasi-tonic, and thus a candidate for what would be recorded using a technique such as
FSCV. This signal can explain the ramping phenomena observed by Howe et al. [14] and also
those observed in more recent experimental work [85]. We speculate below on its network or
biophysical realization.
Potentially at odds with our suggestion that the quantity (1 − γ)hVγ(st+1)i is appropriate for
controlling vigour, changes in the running speed of rats in Howe et al.’s study do not show a
close match to the temporal profile of dopamine concentrations. However, one would not
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necessarily expect a straightforward relationship between these variables, given that the sub-
jects must negotiate environments without crashing into walls. Howe et al. used T-, M-, and S-
shaped mazes, whose turns, unsurprisingly, led to decreases in velocity (see [14], figure 3h–k).
Our analysis suggests that ramps are scaled by the discount factor γ, prompting the question
of how this discount factor is set, whether it is variable or fixed, and indeed, whether it is
unique. There is substantial evidence that human and animal discounting takes a hyperbolic
form [108, 109] rather than being exponential as considered here (which is rather ubiquitous
in engineering and economic settings). This can arise from a combination of two or more expo-
nentials, and it would be most interesting to extend our analysis to this case. From a formal
viewpoint, the discount factor can be seen as the probability per unit time of task termination
or, indeed, as a means of simplifying a problem en route to an ultimate solution [110].
In humans, there is evidence that discount rates can be manipulated experimentally [111]
and that individuals can flexibly vary their discount rates to suit task demands [112]. It has also
been suggested that some regions, notably the striatum, display a graded map of discount rates
which serve reward prediction at different timescales [113, 114]. Howe et al. observed ramping
in dopamine concentration in both ventromedial and dorsolateral striatal areas, though ramp-
ing responses were reported to be more common in ventromedial striatum. Hints of steeper
ramping are perhaps discernible in the average signals reported in ventromedial as opposed to
dorsolateral striatum ([14], figure 1 and extended data figures 3a and 4). However, whether
such ramping signals display systematic, graded differences across the striatum or otherwise
change in response to experimental manipulation of discount factors remains an open question.
Complexities of dopamine release: Phasic, tonic, and quasi-tonic
Whereas the TD account of pre-response transients naturally attributes the observed signal to the
phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons [2, 5–7, 19], the sources of tonic and particularly ‘quasi-
tonic’ dopamine signals are less clear. One long-standing suggestion is that phasic and tonic
modes of firing in dopaminergic cells provide independent control of phasic and tonic dopamine
levels within NAc [26, 115, 116]. Thus, burst firing of dopaminergic neurons is thought to medi-
ate a fast, high-amplitude dopamine transient which is spatially-restricted to a region within or
proximal to release terminals by dopamine reuptake. By contrast, the comparatively slow, irregu-
lar, ‘tonic’mode of activity exhibited by a pool of dopaminergic neurons, potentially of varying
size, is thought to control the more stable, tonic levels of extrasynaptic dopamine. If average
reward rate is represented in tonic levels of dopamine [39], then a natural suggestion is that repre-
sentation of this quantity is controlled by this tonic mode of activity.
Where does a quasi-tonic dopamine signal fit into this picture? It is not clear that the rela-
tively short timescale of change of the ramping signals reported by Howe et al. could arise
through mechanisms thought to modulate tonic activity. On the other hand, ramping in the
phasic activity of dopaminergic neurons has seldom been reported. Fiorillo et al. [117] reported
ramp-like increases in between-trial averaged activity under conditions of uncertain reward
delivery, though interpretation of this result has been controversial [25, 118]. While the paucity
of such reports may simply be due to a lack of appropriate electrophysiological recordings in
spatial tasks—which may also explain why ramping of dopamine concentrations has not been
observed prior to [14]—an interesting alternative is that the gradual increase in dopamine con-
centration is partially- or fully- independent of the activity of dopaminergic cells [15]. As men-
tioned above, a number of local regulatory mechanisms are known to gate the probability of
dopamine release [27, 28], and there is evidence that striatal dopamine release can occur inde-
pendently of dopamine cell firing [119]. An understanding of how these different mechanisms
of dopamine release interrelate is of clear experimental and theoretical interest.
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It should be noted that although we have referred throughout to dopamine signals in the
nucleus accumbens generally, this should not be taken to suggest that dopamine release is
homogeneous within this region. Indeed, FSCV measurements suggest substantial spatial het-
erogeneity [88]. Subregions of NAc have been segregated according to various anatomical fea-
tures, classically into core and shell subregions [120, 121]. Pre-response transients have
typically been observed in NAc core [8–13]. Much interest centres on the functional signifi-
cance of this core-shell distinction [37, 122–125] and, indeed, distinctions at a finer grain
[126], including in relation to possible differences in dopaminergic release [127].
Alternative accounts
We noted above that ramping ostensibly disrupts TD’s explanation for dopaminergic release,
since it would have, oxymoronically, to be a predictable prediction error. Alternative accounts
have been suggested according to which prediction errors indeed persist.
Gershman [128] considered the consequences of an unsuitable state representation. The
idea is that the exponentially discounted value signal Vγ(s) cannot be captured in an error-free
manner if the state (i.e., the position of the animal) is represented in particular, over-generaliz-
ing manners, for instance by units whose activity is governed by the square, rather than linear,
distance to the goal. In this case, a ramping prediction error turns out to arise via persistent
representational error. Place cells [129–131] provide an accessibility-sensitive representation of
space, and the generalization afforded by the coarse-coding they imply is often useful [132].
However, it is also known that Bayesian decoding of even a modest number of such cells leads
to surprisingly accurate localization of animals in their environments [133], and thus what
would amount to a table-lookup representation that would not lead to persistent error. Of
course, one must remember that this sort of decoding is in silico, rather than in vivo.
Morito and Kato [134] have also also suggested that the Howe et al. ramping signal reflects
persistent prediction errors. In their proposal, these arise out of the assumption of a time-
dependent decay of learned state values. One challenge for this model is that its generation of
ramping signals qualitatively similar to that observed experimentally appears to be unstable to
changes in reward magnitude [134], and indeed to the passage of more substantial periods of
time.
Experimental tests
The most pressing consideration is a set of experiments that can test and refine or reject these
various mechanisms, and understand how they might work together. Perhaps the most
straightforward to test is the last suggestion, since it is unique in its dependence on discounting.
Given that the rate of this should be sensitive to things like the reliability of the environment
[135], it would be interesting to manipulate these factors, determine the extent to which behav-
iour changes appropriately, and concurrently measure ramping. Similarly, it may be that indi-
vidual differences in discounting, as measured by choices between immediate, smaller rewards
and delayed, larger rewards, can be predicted by the rate of ramping. Although behaviour gen-
erally follows hyperbolic rather than exponential discounting [109], this would only make a
modest difference at the timescales that appear relevant for the sort of ramping behaviour
observed by Howe et al.
Testing the second suggestion could be accomplished using photo-uncaging of dopamine in
the accumbens (for instance, using RuBi-Dopa [136]), since of the three mechanisms, it sug-
gests the strongest coupling between dopamine and immediate behaviour. Optogenetically-
stimulated release (using TH-CRE or DAT-CRE lines) could also be employed, although it
would then be hard to distinguish the specifically dopaminergic component from any other
Tamping Ramping: Explanations of Phasic Dopamine Signals in the Accumbens
PLOS Computational Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004622 December 23, 2015 27 / 34
influences of the (potentially antidromically-stimulated) activity of the dopamine neurons. It
would be interesting to contrast the results of this with direct stimulation of D1-receptor-con-
taining and D2-receptor-containing neurons [137] to try to assess downstream mechanisms.
Testing the relationship between actor and critic is particularly tricky, since we know so lit-
tle about the implementation (or indeed existence) of either and, in particular, the micro- or
nano-scopic nature of choice over time [40]. Nevertheless, it would certainly be interesting to
compare the nature and magnitude of ramping when subjects are made to wait for shorter or
longer times, with and without cues for the precise passage of time that could be exploited.
More generally, key issues surround the relationships between the number of dopamine
cells that are active, the phasic and tonic activity of those neurons, the spatiotemporal profile of
the concentration of dopamine at receptor targets in the accumbens, and the action of this
dopamine on those receptors (along with the action on target neurons of other neurotransmit-
ters co-released by the same neuronal activity). This information is key for making qualitative
and ultimately quantitative progress.
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